Background Influential views on how to protect patient autonomy in clinical care have been greatly shaped by rational and deliberative models of decision-making.
Introduction
Respect for patientsÕ autonomy is widely regarded as a defining principle of humane care. Conceptualizations of autonomy in medicine have usually been individualistic, relying on patientsÕ self-determination to protect their interests in the face of practitionersÕ power. Influential models of decision-making therefore emphasize the importance of patientsÕ participation in information transfer, reflection and deliberation. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] Similarly, the current practice of informed consent, widely regarded as underpinning self-determination and patient protection, emphasizes the need for patients to have information upon which to reflect, and options upon which to deliberate, before deciding whether to accept interventions. [7] [8] [9] This approach to implementing autonomy has been debated theoretically, because autonomy has broader interpretations than self-determination, and clinically, because many patients do not want to take responsibility for decision-making or lack the knowledge or are too impaired by illness to do so. 2, [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] Theory and practice recommendations that are ethically and clinically sound should be based on understanding how general principles can be reconciled with local realities. This insight, in turn, can be gained from studying how practitioners and patients resolve ethical dilemmas in routine practice. 18 In this study, we therefore analysed patientsÕ accounts of decision-making in a clinical situation precluding extended deliberation. These were patients with newly diagnosed intraocular melanoma who were offered prognostic tests to indicate whether their tumour was likely to be fatal. We reasoned that this could be particularly informative about how autonomy is preserved or threatened in situations that are incompatible with reflective and deliberative decision-making. Intraocular (uveal) melanomas are rare, with annual incidence of about six per million. Almost 50% of patients 19 develop metastatic disease, usually involving the liver and always fatal. Metastatic death occurs almost exclusively in patients whose melanoma shows partial or complete loss of chromosome 3 on cytogenetic testing. 20, 21 In patients with a lethal melanoma, the dimensions of the ocular tumour and the histological grade of malignancy indicate likely survival time. Cytogenetic testing of tissue samples taken at the time of primary ocular treatment therefore indicates prognosis for survival: patients with disomy 3 can be reassured that life-expectancy is not significantly worsened by their tumour whereas those with monosomy 3 will almost certainly die of their disease within a few years. Although testing currently offers no appreciable survival benefit, virtually all patients accept it when it is offered. 22 This finding is consistent with a recent report which concludes that patients with choroidal melanoma desire such prognostic information 23 and with a previous report on colorectal cancer. 24 However, there are concerns that technologies that provide prognostic information without improving survival might harm patients. 20 At the time of the study, patients offered cytogenetic testing at our centre had little opportunity to reflect on their decision: a fresh sample of tumour tissue was required and needed to be collected at the time of treatment, which was usually the day after diagnosis. We designed the study to answer two broad questions. How do patients decide whether to accept testing and what factors do they consider in doing so? How do they evaluate their decision subsequently and, in particular, how do they respond to and use the information that the test provides?
Method

Participants
Patients were referred from across the British Isles for assessment and treatment of uveal melanoma at a national specialist centre for adult ocular tumours, which was the first, internationally, to offer patients cytogenetic testing. Its protocol for offering the test to patients begins after initial clinical assessment, when the ocular oncologist informs the patient about the diagnosis, prognosis and treatment options. If planned treatment is enucleation or local resection, the patient is given the option for cytogenetic testing to determine whether the tumour is Ôlife threateningÕ. Patients are told that a bad result would lead to consultation with an oncologist, who would offer 6-monthly liver scans in the hope of detecting metastatic disease before symptom onset. Patients are warned that screening rarely prolongs life so the main benefits would be reassurance or Ôlife-planningÕ. After opportunity for questions patients are asked whether they would like the test. Where they are uncertain, the ocular oncologist reassures them that most patients who have had the test were pleased to have done so. Patients receive an audio-recording of the consultation. A specialist nurse then reviews what has been said and provides written information about treatment and the test. Next, a specialist registrar seeks written consent from each patient, at the same time requesting permission to use any tissues, data and images for research, teaching and quality control studies. While some patients return to their local hospital for enucleation, most are treated at the specialist centre, usually within 24 h.
Cytogenetic studies and histological investigations are described elsewhere. 20 Prognosis was estimated according to cytogenetic type, histological grade of malignancy and clinical stage of tumour growth. 25 Patients with good prognosis (life expectancy not significantly reduced) received a letter, copied to their GP and local opthalmologist, explaining that their life-expectancy was almost normal and inviting them to discuss the result with the specialist nurse by telephone. Patients with poor prognosis (disease likely to be fatal) were invited for consultation with a medical oncologist, who explained the result and its significance and offered 6-monthly screening (biochemical liver function tests and magnetic resonance imaging). Patients unable to return to the centre were referred to an oncologist near their home. Patients developing metastatic disease were investigated and referred to a surgeon for potential resection of liver metastases or offered entry into ongoing chemotherapy trials. Details of clinical management are reported elsewhere.
20,25
Patient selection and recruitment
After ethical approval, patients were sampled in two ways (Fig. 1 ). Thirty-four previous patients were selected from clinical records who: had been treated by enucleation or local resection for uveal melanoma: had been offered cytogenetic testing; and lived within 60 miles of the study centre. Sampling was purposive to ensure inclusion of males and females across the age-range for this population and, because we anticipated that patientsÕ perspective on the test might evolve as they adjusted to the results and the screening programme, to include patients who had received their results up to 3 years previously. As potentially critical cases, we selected all those (n = 2) who had declined the test. After contacting the GP or oncologist to exclude patients experiencing any illness-related crisis, we wrote to 25 patients requesting consent to interview; 15 consented and were interviewed 4-44 months after primary ocular treatment (0-36 months after receiving results). As the study progressed, we preferentially recruited patients with poor prognosis to test and develop our understanding of apparent contradictions in their accounts. To examine explicitly whether and how patientsÕ views changed over time, in particular from before to after receiving test results, we selected nine additional current patients for sequential interviews. They were identified 1-2 days after initial ocular treatment and asked for consent for up to three interviews over the following 2 years. Seven consented; all were interviewed before receiving their cytogenetic results; six were re-interviewed 1-4 months after receiving their results (one could not be contacted after the first interview); four provided a third interview approximately 1 year later (one died of metastases before this and one withdrew). In all, 22 patients (15 previous and seven current) participated in 32 interviews.
Interviews
Interviews were in patientsÕ homes or in a private area of the oncology clinic and were semi- structured according to a guide. The researcher prompted previous patients to talk about experiences and expectations in six areas: (i) recollections of being offered the test and how they decided; (ii) understanding of its purpose or value; (iii) reasons for wanting prognostication and concerns about it; (iv) understanding of their risk of metastatic death; (v) understanding of their own test results; and (vi) how they had responded to the results. In their first interview, current patients were prompted to talk about areas i-iv, their experience of awaiting results and their anticipation of how results might affect them. At their second and third interviews, they were asked about how they had received their results and (iv-vi) above. Particular attention was paid to comparing experiences with expectations.
The researcher adopted a conversational style, avoiding closed questions in favour of prompts and reflections to facilitate patientsÕ talk. Patients therefore determined the pace and sequencing of interviews, which lasted 22-65 min and were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim (except for anonymization).
Data analysis
Analysis, led by SC, proceeded in parallel with the interviews and was inductive in that no categories were specified in advance. Transcripts were read and discussed by SC and PS to identify recurrent patterns so as to build a thematic framework incrementally. This was tested and modified by constant comparison, ÔcyclingÕ between sets of data and the developing account of them, searching for disconfirmatory cases and by discussion amongst the wider team. We first analysed patientsÕ accounts descriptively. However, inconsistencies -in particular, describing different reasons for valuing the test at different times -led to more interpretive analysis. We therefore became concerned with the need to distinguish patientsÕ explanations of their behaviour from their justifications. Analysis was finalized when no further changes emerged from this process and when all the relevant text could be accommodated by it. In our final analysis, most elements were defined by commonality of meaning across data from several patients. In addition,
Patients identified (34)
Excluded by GP/Oncol - (9) Included by GP/Oncol - (25) Deceased (1) Not registered (1) Not suitable (7) Patient consented (15) Patient declined (4) No response (7)
Previous patients selected from clinical records
Patients approached (9) Declined (2) Consented (7) Completed interview 2 (6) Could not be contacted (1) Completed interview 3 (4) Withdrew (1) Deceased (1) Current patients selected for sequential interviews Reconciling autonomy with informed consent, S A Cook et al. we report two cases whose atypical experience was particularly informative about factors that were relevant generally. Standards by which we assessed the developing analysis included coherence and Ôtheoretical validityÕ whereby conclusions should connect with theoretical ideas beyond the present study. 26 We were also concerned with Ôcatalytic validityÕ; 27 that is, findings should have the potential to change theory or practice.
In reporting the analysis, we present transcript to illustrate the meaning of each category of the analysis. Data extracts are labelled according to the patient; for patients interviewed sequentially, the number of the interview in the sequence is indicated (e.g. P16 ⁄ 1 is the first interview of patient P16). The ellipsis indicates omitted speech.
Findings
Sample characteristics
The sample included nine men and 13 women aged 39-79 years (Table 1) . One had declined testing and most had poor prognosis. One had developed resectable liver metastases and one had been diagnosed with incurable metastases at the time of interview.
PatientsÕ accounts
Most patients were positive about having the test; only one (P20) criticized its management and only one (P6) regretted her decision (these atypical cases are described further below). There was striking consistency in patientsÕ accounts of deciding about the test and in how they evaluated their decision and described using the results. All except one consented to the test. When asked about their decision, those who had accepted were all enthusiastic as P1, with a poor prognosis result, illustrated when asked if she would have preferred not to know: ÔIÕm glad I had it, I was really glad I had itÕ(P1). The only patient who declined Ôwished IÕd had it…I would advise people to have it, because they will always think ''No, I should have done it''Õ(P6).
Accepting the test was the only thing to do
Whether to have the test was typically presented as an ÔautomaticÕ decision; no patient recalled consciously weighing the decision or considering an alternative to the one made. When specifically asked to recall the decision, a typical response was that: ÔI never thought about it… I never asked, IÕve never thought about it to be honest, I just know that itÕs done and … I feel greatÕ(P2). One patient was explicit that ÔI really canÕt say that I thought rationally about it at allÕ(P13), but several others explained that the shock of diagnosis precluded hearing, understanding and appraising information about the test (Box 1). Indeed, a few patients at the start of the interview did not even recall being offered the test. Of those who did, none recalled considering how they might respond to the prognostic information, and patients interviewed before receiving results were still unable to think about how they might react as P17 illustrated:
P17: ÔI canÕt answer that [how I will react]… I canÕt because until I actually, like, get the results, I donÕt know, do I, how I am going to feel or, I mean, if itÕs a good result, IÕm going to be happy. But if itÕs not, obviously IÕm going to be down and I canÕt answer that until I actually get the results…Õ Interviewer: ÔI just wondered whether it was something you had thought ahead to or not?Õ P17: Ô…No, I havenÕt, not at the minute, no. IÕm just taking every day as it comesÕ.
As another patient interviewed before receiving her results explained: ÔItÕs too frightening to think of the worst case scenario, it really, really isÕ(P21 ⁄ 1). PatientsÕ emotional state therefore precluded considered decisions. Similarly, the one patient who declined the test attributed this explicitly to emotional factors, recounting several family problems: ÔI didnÕt want to find out if there was anything… I was scared… I had too much going onÕ(P6).
Furthermore, recurring language in patientsÕ accounts implied that, rather than actively choosing, they were Ôgoing along withÕ with an expectation to have the test: for example in describing having Ôagreed straight away really, that I would like to knowÕ(P16 ⁄ 1) or being Ôhappy withÕ (P3) having the test. They saw it as natural continuation of treatment stating, for example, that: ÔI thought it was done automatically, you know. You do any operation, you automatically investigate what you have done, so I really didnÕt query or think anything untoward about it.Õ(P3). Therefore, it seemed that the key influence on patients accepting the test was that they were offered it.
Box 1 The impossibility of a reasoned decision
Patients described several reasons why they were unable to assimilate information about the test: Being too shocked to take in what they were told Whether I realised what I was saying when I signed that consent form I donÕt know, because it was just sort of a whirr, my husband wasnÕt very well at the time, we were both shocked… It was just I donÕt, like a bad dream really … So I really canÕt say I thought rationally about it at all. (P13) Denying the seriousness of the diagnosis All the telling me what it was and all that, just didnÕt register with me at all …It didnÕt hit meÕ til weeks later … You only pick up on certain things donÕt you when they say um, you just shut off donÕt you. (P8) Being too anxious or upset Well I think I signed some consent forms for tests and things like that if I remember rightly... To be honest with you, I was in a bit of a, how should I put it, I were in a bit of a, I was a little bit afraid. I didnÕt notice a lot, to be honest.
Reconciling autonomy with informed consent, S A Cook et al. Secondly, patients interviewed before receiving results described the difficulty of living with uncertainty about prognosis. A typical response was that: ÔIt isnÕt sometimes what you know, itÕs the things that you donÕt know that can be worseÕ(P16 ⁄ 1). They therefore described anticipating that the test results would enable them to Ômove onÕ, and that even results indicating poor prognosis would help: ÔFor me, whether it be good news or bad news, itÕs sort of, itÕs bringing your life back into your controlÕ(P21 ⁄ 1). Being able to plan was central: ÔI think the more information you have got and the more prepared you are for it then it helps really. ItÕs not such a frightening experience then … [The result would] enable you then to plan everything out yourself financially and health-wise and whateverÕ(P16 ⁄ 1).
Thirdly, almost all indicated that accepting the test was also ÔrightÕ in as much as it met expectations of others, particularly hospital staff, and fulfilled perceived obligations to them, to other patients and to their own families (Box 2). However, given the instantaneous decisions that patients described and the absence of conscious deliberation, these reasons why having the test was ÔrightÕ are likely to be post hoc justifications rather than explanations of the decision.
Meaning of results depended on the care context
Once patients had received a poor prognosis, their reasons for valuing the test changed. None referred spontaneously to the increased likelihood of metastases or death, and none described using the information for end-of-lifeplanning. Instead, most were explicit that, as P3 explained, they were Ônot going to worry about the futureÕ, and they described focusing on reestablishing normal routines. P16 illustrated this divergence between anticipation and experience of poor prognosis results. When prompted about his previous reference to life planning (quoted above), he emphasized a return to normality and described a future structured by the 6-month interval between screenings: ÔWell I think it allows you to move on, but you donÕt quite move on in a straight line really... IÕm moving on by saying I need to get back to work …I donÕt suppose you will ever know 100% …but every 6 months you can sort of say well, things are OK, and itÕs another 6 months you can sort of forget really isnÕt it.Õ(P16 ⁄ 2) Despite poor prognosis, and no objective relief from uncertainty, patients described how the test allowed them to feel hopeful (Box 3). First, it maximized chances of survival because it instigated screening that would enable early detection of metastases, which they perceived as key to curative treatment. Secondly, receiving the Ôall clearÕ after screening provided intervals of perceived safety. That is, the screening helped patients to define a ÔfutureÕ which was sufficiently short for them to feel safe in it; without it, the future still felt intolerable (Box 4). Finally, regular screening provided a continued sense of security in being cared for. Uncertainty continued to trouble the patient who declined testing and therefore received no follow-up screening or care: Of five patients with good prognosis, only one immediately recalled receiving her result (she had been interviewed sequentially, and the previous interview might have reminded her of the test). One other patient subsequently showed the interviewer his result letter and another later recalled the GP mentioning that the result was good. These patients said that they simply assumed ÔNo news is good newsÕ or that: ÔWhen I left there and there was no further follow-up…I just thought everything must be alright … because I would have been informed surelyÕ(P7). However, the one patient who spontaneously recalled receiving a good prognosis was not completely reassured: ÔInitially I was made up, cos as they said, like, everything was fine, but I have got my little doubts because I think I proved them wrong last timeÕ(P22 ⁄ 2).
Summary of findings
Patients could not make a considered decision because of the emotionality of the situation. They trusted the clinician and readily accepted what was offered; that is, they did not distinguish the test from Ôroutine careÕ. Nevertheless, patients were committed to the decision to accept the test, justifying it using normative ideas including altruism and the importance of being ÔinformedÕ and Ôtaking controlÕ. Once received, the resultsÕ meaning depended entirely on the context provided by other aspects of their care. The offer of continuing follow-up allowed patients to invest poor prognosis results with hope, whereas the absence of continued clinical contact reduced the salience of a good prognosis. 
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first detailed study of how patients with cancer decide about their care in a situation that precluded extended deliberation. The most important finding was that, from patientsÕ perspective, consenting to prognostic testing was not a discrete event. The testÕs significance for patients was entirely contingent on other aspects of their care. Our findings therefore diverge from current principles and practice of informed consent.
Making the decision: the test was part of ongoing care
We approached the study assuming that the invitation to have the test was a significant event for patients but it proved not to be. Most patients did not see themselves as having a decision to make. Some did not recall the test and none described weighing potential consequences in considering it. Therefore, while models of shared decision-making and ethical ideas of informed consent emphasize patientsÕ participation in information transfer, reflection and deliberation, 2,5,7-9,28-30 none of these was evident here. Patients were emotional rather than rational, being too shocked to assimilate information for an informed decision, and being unable to confront what poor prognosis would mean.
For most patients, their instantaneous choice simply meant going along with the ocular oncologistÕs offer. That is, they followed an heuristic to trust what experts suggest. 31 As in previous studies of patients with cancer, they valued cliniciansÕ expertise; 32,33 their consent amounted to trust. 34 Therefore, from the patientsÕ perspective, accepting the test was no more a decision than were their ÔdecisionsÕ to accept some other clinical procedures, such as anaesthesia. There is other evidence that, when offered decisions about predictive or diagnostic testing for serious disease, many people regard their response as requiring no decision-making. [35] [36] [37] The only thing I got was ''thereÕs good ones, thereÕs bad ones and thereÕs medium ones'' and I came up with the medium one… So IÕm in limbo…IÕm fit with a medium risk is that a good or bad chance? You donÕt know do you?... IÕm worried now that IÕve got it somewhere else, so every ache and pain in my body is cancer…so thatÕs not putting my mind at ease. After learning of the screening programme He felt no reduction in uncertainty I understood that if they did this operation and sent it away for the test theyÕd be able to tell me whether it would go further, whether anything had broken away from it but that wasnÕt the fact … Nobody could answer the question there.
Instead, he felt cared for
The follow-upÕs been fantastic …IÕll not say they are 100% perfect or what, they canÕt promise anything but at least you know theyÕve got their eye on it This allowed him to avoid thinking of the future I just put that [cancer] PatientsÕ acceptance of the test cannot be described as mere compliance. They displayed what Kukla termed Ôconscientious autonomyÕ in that they offered retrospective accounts of the decision that went beyond conformity and showed ownership of the decision, which is consistent with a recent report 23 that patients are positive about prognostic information. In doing this, most presented it as serving othersÕ interests, particularly other patientsÕ, but also practitionersÕ, for example by providing information to help research. That is, they drew on altruistic interpretations of their behaviour. [45] [46] [47] Others indicated that accepting the test met normative expectations about being involved and informed. 35, 48, 49 Therefore, most patients accounted for their decision morally rather than rationally. However, these accounts are best seen as justifications for having the test; the most likely explanation for accepting it without deliberation remains that the ocular oncologist, whom they trusted, offered it.
Using the results: their meaning was contingent on ongoing care
The way that patients used the results also depended on practitionersÕ ongoing care. While awaiting results, patients envisaged using them to reduce uncertainty and, in some cases, plan their lives. After receiving results, however, the function changed, and life-planning was unimportant. Beran et al. 23 finding that, after receiving poor prognosis results, patients valued these for life-planning emerged in responses to retrospective questionnaires which may be less sensitive to subtle changes in patientsÕ thinking than qualitative interviews. Patients with good prognosis did not recall the result as a salient event. Moreover, the single patient who explicitly recalled receiving a good prognosis did not trust it sufficiently for complete reassurance. It seems that practitionersÕ behaviour was more salient than the results letter. That is, in the absence of a consultation where they were explicitly told of their prognosis, they gained more reassurance from not being called back. PractitionerÕs behaviour also explained why patients with poor prognosis results did see the test as reassuring. Instead of responding by lifeplanning for a curtailed future as they had anticipated, the result led to patients feeling hopeful about the future. For most patients, this depended on the screening programme that poor prognosis results triggered. Patients derived hope from this programme in three ways. First, it provided a sense of continuing in a caring relationship, which is already known to provide hope. 50 Secondly, it meant that early treatment would be available, and treatment also provides hope. 51 Finally, screening allowed patients to adopt a time-scale, defined by intervals between screenings, within which they could feel safe. That is, whereas objectively screening describes what has occurred in the previous 6 months, patients interpreted the Ôall-clearÕ as providing safety for the subsequent 6 months until the next screening. In this way, patients used screening to redefine the future as a period for which they could achieve a feeling of safety and return to normality. A patient who, uniquely in this sample, received his results before the offer of screening showed how the objective uncertainty that remains after poor prognosis results remained intolerable without the promise of screening. He felt hopeful only after the offer of screening allowed him to constrain his view of the future. Therefore, while good prognosis results were isolated from clinical relationships and so meant little to patients, poor-prognosis results were a source of hope because they were integrated into a programme of continuing care.
Reconciling autonomy with informed consent, S A Cook et al. Therefore, the functions that patients ascribed to the test changed over time. In this respect also, the findings are hard to reconcile with current models of consent and decision-making: patients cannot be regarded as providing deliberated, informed consent if the meaning to them of what they are consenting to changes after they consent.
Limitations of the study
When people are interviewed about decisions that they have made or accepted, their responses might be products of cognitive dissonance, whereby they retrospectively find plausible justifications for their own behaviour, 52 or such justifications might be constructed for self-presentation in the interview. Neither is likely here. Patients described functions, particularly hope, that are supported by previous literature on responses to life-threatening illness. Moreover, neither cognitive dissonance nor self-presentation explains why the patient who declined the test described her decision negatively. By interviewing a subset of patients sequentially, we confirmed that the functions they ascribed to the test changed after they received results, which is also hard to attribute to cognitive dissonance or to attempts to provide plausible justifications to the interviewer. The sample was limited: we were able to interview only one patient who declined the test; relatively few patients with good prognosis were included; and we had little information from patients who had developed metastases. Furthermore, it is not clear how the protocol for offering the test was implemented in practice and to what degree it may have varied between patients. Further research with a larger sample encompassing all these sources of variability and incorporating direct observation of how the test was offered to participants is needed. As a qualitative study, the findings cannot automatically be generalized. Instead, their importance is to challenge existing assumptions in literature on decision-making and consent and to suggest the need for a new conceptual approach where patients do not see decisions to be made.
Implications of the findings
We have described what occurred in practice. In considering what should occur, the conventional principles and procedures of informed consent and shared decision-making are unhelpful. Stronger procedures to ensure that the decision is ÔinformedÕ, such as requiring lengthier or more strenuous consent procedures, would introduce Ôrituals of consentÕ 13 that would be unlikely to change the structure of relationships and expectations that determine patientsÕ nearunanimous acceptance of the test. 2 Similarly, seeking complete equipoise in presenting the test is implausible. Merely offering it probably suggests in this context that it has value. Moreover, the offer creates the uncertainty that only the test can then resolve, 35 and evokes the culturally-based obligation to Ôbe informedÕ that only the test can then meet. 35, 48, 49 Therefore, the offer of the test unavoidably influenced the patientÕs attitudes about it and was inevitably the main determinant of the patient accepting it. From this perspective, protecting patientsÕ autonomy requires two questions to be addressed. If the offer of the test is the key influence on patientsÕ acceptance it is necessary, first, for clinicians to have evidence that patients will be helped, and not harmed, by the test. That is, the responsibility to protect patientsÕ interests remains with clinicians and cannot be devolved to the patient by the consent procedure. The practitionersÕ role as patientsÕ ÔagentsÕ 53 is therefore inescapable. If the test is to be offered, the next question is how to respect patientsÕ autonomy while acknowledging their trust in the clinician. 15 We suggest that this is a question about how to allow patients to have a sense of ownership of their decision, rather than how to ensure that they take responsibility for it. 2 Where patients are distressed and vulnerable, such as in the present study, the clinical relationship needs to emphasize authority and trust, 54 and ownership is consistent with guidance from the clinician in the absence of detailed information and deliberation. Where patients are less vulnerable or more confident or authoritative, or for patients who find it hard to trust their practiReconciling autonomy with informed consent, S A Cook et al.
Ó 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Health Expectations, 14, pp.383-396 tioners, the relationship will need explicitly to address feelings of autonomy, even to the point of detailed information and overt consent with the possibility that patients will reject an intervention that might help them.
The clinical model that we studied was very specific, but there are probably other similar situations in clinical care where an expert clinicianÕs suggestion or offer of an intervention is the critical factor in patients accepting it. For example, in cancer care, patients will accept chemotherapy even without appreciable survival benefit. 55, 56 The general principle that the present study points to is to dissociate cliniciansÕ responsibility for ensuring that proffered interventions are in patientsÕ interests from their need to integrate the offer into the type of relationship that the patient needs. Patients in this study who accepted the test felt ownership over the decision to do so and were positive about it. Therefore, one direction for future research is to study how clinicians such as those in the study centre negotiate these ethical and clinical dilemmas in practice in order to guide patientsÕ consent while supporting their sense of ownership and autonomy. 17 
